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Abstract 
This study considers individual voting behavior on propositions. After controlling for 
voter and election specific attributes, we determine the effects of proposition attributes, 
such as proposition position and readability on roll-off and voter fatigue. If proposition 
attributes affect voting behavior and if their attributes can be influenced by supporters, 
including interest groups, then any such potential advantages should be ameliorated in 
the interest of "equal" political representation. As an example, advantages of ballot 
position can be minimized by modifying the linkage between the qualification sequence 
and the ballot sequence. 
Using individual level ballot data taken from Los Angeles county, we find that the 
proposition position is negatively related to the probability of voting on a proposition 
and the probability of voting "Yes" on bonds and initiatives.· We also find that reading 
ease is positively related to the probability of voting on a proposition and the probability 
of voting "Yes" on bonds and initiatives. 
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1 Introduction 
Studies of direct legislation have converged around the issues of representation and polit­
ical "fairness". The issues range from the prospect of "buying" a proposition to consid­
ering which population segments are impacted negatively in the voting process (Bowler, 
Donovan and Happ (1992), Darcy and Schneider (1989), Magleby (1984), Owens and 
Wade (1986), and Zisk (1987)). Although representation is sometimes measured in terms 
of the relative numbers of voters that cast ballots from minority groups and majority 
groups, these measures do not capture the representativeness of particular outcomes. A 
voter is arguably not fully represented by direct legislation until she casts a ballot on the 
proposition. 
In this study we analyze individual level ballot data to discern the actual distribution 
of votes cast. The examination of actual ballots reveals new insights on voter behavior. 
For instance, we are able to ascertain the percentage of voters who cast valid votes on .all 
the propositions. We are also able to determine how many voters vote only on specific 
propositions. We find that the majority of voters cast valid votes on all, or all except 
one, propositions on the ballot. In addition, we find that the distribution of votes cast 
appears relatively uniform for those voters casting less than a full ballot. Finally, our 
analysis supports the hypothesis that voters "roll-off" the ballot and that the effect of 
ballot position on the propensity to vote affirmatively differs by proposition form (bond, 
initiative, or legislative proposal).1 
The possibility that voting at all on a proposition or that voting in a particular 
way on a proposition may be influenced by-its placement-on the ballot is reminiscent 
of the rather extensive literature on question and response order effects in individual­
level surveys (Schuman and Presser, 1981). As is the case of individual surveys, where 
respondents are posed questions not in isolation but as part of a continuous flow of 
1 A third measure of voter participation is "drop-off", where the percentage of voters participating in 
propositions races is compared to the percentage of voters casting ballots on candidate races. Although 
drop-off may be important, our analysis is limited to studying roll-off and voter fatigue. 
questioning, voters march through a ballot typically in a linear fashion. Based on results 
from survey research it is reasonable to question whether the context in which a ballot 
item appears or its position in a sequence of items influences the outcome. 
The importance of sequencing has, of course, not gone unnoticed by the California 
legislature since its rules require that candidate positions be rotated across the electorate 
in candidate elections. Additionally, the rules for California elections mandate that 
bond issues precede legislative proposals, which in turn precede initiatives on the ballot, 
with all proposition items following the candidate elections. Presumably this ordering_ is 
purposeful. If the sequence of propositions influences the outcomes, even within major 
groupings of items, then further randomization of items should be considered as a matter . 
of public policy. The current practice of first to qualify, first to appear instead leaves 
substantial room for interest groups and others to influence outcomes. 
Our analysis focuses on a voter's decisions while in the voting booth. 2 Voters decide 
whether to cast a vote for each contest, and which position on that contest is the most 
beneficial. We analyze two distinct behaviors that are possible in the voting booth. First, 
voters may roll-off, i.e., stop voting mid-way through the ballot because at some point 
they determine it is not worth their time and effort to continue voting. If roll-off exists 
then a proposition's ballot position may impact the number of people casting votes and 
the ultimate outcome. Another possibility is that "ballot fatigue" occurs when voters 
tire of making decisions and vote for the status quo on. the remainder of the ballot. 3 
To test these theories, we employ data from three recent general elections in California, 
1988, 1990, and 1992, where voters faced complex ballots containing 29, 28, and 13 
propositions, respectively. Our data represent the actual votes from two to three million 
ballots cast in Los Angeles county for each election studied. Since prior studies focus 
on either surveys or aggregate data, one contribution of this analysis is to study voting 
behavior using individual level ballot data. We match demographic data and ballot 
characteristics to the individual ballots to control for these factors while isolating the 
effects due to ballot position, length, and readability.4 
Our results reveal the impact of ballot position, readability, and ballot length on 
proposition voting behavior in Los Angeles county.5 We show that several factors in­
fluence participation rates in direct legislation and therefore the representativeness and 
ultimate outcomes of specific contests. Some of these factors can be influenced by kn.owl-
20n a broader level a voter's decisions include registration and turnout. For additional information 
on those decisions, see Dubin and Kalsow (1997). 
3See Bowler, Donovan, and Happ (1992) and Robson and Walsh (1974) for additional information on 
voters tiring in the middle of the ballot. 
4Prior studies employ aggregate election results and use ballot and election characteristics as their 
explanatory factors (e.g., see Bowler, Donovan, and Happ (1992), Darcy and Schneider (1989), and Zisk 
(1987)). Other studies look primarily at voter attributes (see Clubb and Traugott (1972) and Magleby 
(1984)). This study uses a combination of demographics and ballot characteristics to explore proposition 
voting behavior. 
5Since Los Angeles county is racially and ethnically heterogeneous, the results should apply to other 
locations facing increasing cultural diversity. 
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edgeable groups, such as industry-sponsored interest groups. These include the proposi­
tion's ballot position and the readability of the associated text. 
Section 2 of this paper summarizes previous finding on proposition participation, bal­
lot· roll-off, and voter fatigue. Section 3 introduces our discrete-choice model of propo-
sition voting while section 4 presents information on the data sources used in our esti­
mation. Hypotheses regarding the affect of ballot position and other factors are given 
in Section 5. Section 6 contains the results of the analysis, and Section 7 concludes and 
discusses the implications of the results. · 
2 Previous Findings on Proposition Participation 
In this section we summarize the literature on proposition voting and direct legislation 
as it pertains to the issues of participation, roll-off, and voter fatigue. We begin with 
several studies of proposition voting which employed aggregate data and analyzed voting 
behavior over time. 
Owens and Wade (1986) studied California proposition voting from 1924 to 1984 in 
relation to campaign spending, and found that success rates are stable over time, as 
are inflation adjusted costs. 6 Wolfinger and Greenstein (1968) analyzed the repeal of 
the Fair Housing Act in California and found that outcomes were independent of any 
mistakes resulting from the complexity of the ballot. Zisk (1987) found a five to fifteen 
percentage decrease in participation on propositions, as compared to the top candidate 
races. 7 However, she found that a voters decision to cast a vote, vote negatively, or 
abstain is not related to proposition position. Zisk also found support for increased levels 
of voting on citizen initiated propositions over legislative proposals and that differences 
in campaign intensity and issue salience matter. 
Several studies of ballot roll-off and voter fatigue are similar to our analysis. Two of 
the earliest articles on voter fatigue were those by Burnham (1965) and Mueller (1965). 
Burnham determines that "roll-off" within candidate races increased from 1907 to 1962, 
as did voter drop-off in non-Presidential year elections. 8 Mueller attributes roll-off to 
differences in campaign spending and the voting behavior on surrounding propositions. 9 
60wens and Wade use aggregate election returns for 102 initiatives. They regress the winner's share 
on the winner's expenditures and the loser's expenditures. 
7Zisk's study is based on aggregate election results and survey data from Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Oregon, and California for the period 1976 to 1980. 
8Burnham reports a statistic he terms "roll-off" -as·the number uf people casting votes for a lower 
office, divided by the number of people casting votes for the most prestigious office on the ballot. 
9Mueller's study of roll-off on California propositions is based on a sample composed of 1085 absentee 
ballots and 209 precinct ballots from the 1964 general election in Los Angeles county. His use of absentee 
ballots as the majority of his sample, however, greatly reduces the ability to generalize from his results. 
The completion rate for absentee voters on propositions in Los Angeles county is approximately 5 percent 
below that for precinct voters in the 1988 through,1992 elections. The absentee sub precinct ballot 
completion rates are 80.7, 84.3, 84.7, 84.3, 85.4, and 84.9 percent for the 1988 Primary, 1988 General, 
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Mueller also presented an analysis of proposition voting from 1918 to 1968 in which 
he determined that the number of negative votes increases with the proposition's bal­
lot position. Clubb and Traugott (1972) confirm that white, educated, higher income, 
higher social class individuals who read the newspaper and are more interested in politics 
vote more often on referenda.10 However, they note that lower social class individuals 
participate on a more consistent basis if the issue is salient or if the race is close. 
More recently, Magleby (1984) reported the "drop-off" percentages for California 
propositions from 1970 to 1982.11 He observed that drop-off on propositions was not 
greater in presidential" election yf3ars, contradicting previous theory on the surge and 
decline of voting behavior. He also found evidence that longer ballots affect drop-off.12 
Magleby also studied the impact of demographic characteristics on the probability of 
voting on a proposition. He found that nonwhite voters vote on fewer issues, as do older 
voters, blue collar voters, and low income voters. In addition, he found that higher 
levels of education are positively correlated with completing more of the ballot and that 
proposition readability affects the participation level in proposition voting.13 
Vanderleeuw and Engstrom (1987) report that African-Americans roll-off at faster 
rates than whites, even when controlling for age and education.14 Darcy and Schneider 
(1988) find that more confusing ballots, i.e. , those with more page turns and complex 
formats, lead to more roll-off.15 They also find that African-Americans roll-off more fre­
quently than do whites.16 Bowler, Donovan, and Happ (1992) demonstrate that propo­
sition voting is related to the total campaign spending, type of proposition, source of 
proposition, length, and turnout.17 
1990 Primary, 1990 General, 1992 Primary, and 1992 General Elections, respectively. These compare 
with voting sub precinct ballot completion percentages of 87.3, 87.9, 88.5, 89.4, 88.6, and 89.6 percent 
for the respective elections (California Secretary of State, Election Results Rental File). 
10Clubb and Traugott study post election survey results from the NES. Their methodology involves 
. computing a turnout percentage for referenda as well as a turnout figure based on the number of ballots 
cast for a major office. 
11 Magleby's definition of drop-off was based on the number of votes cast in a particular contest divided 
by the total number of ballots cast in the election. 
12Magleby (1984) computes the drop-off percentage for the 1976 general and the 1978 primary elections 
in California. Using aggregate vote percentages from the Statement of Vote, he finds that there are 
differences in drop-off rates between proposition forms, and that in general, drop-off increases with 
proposition number. 
13Magleby surmises that voters have limited attention spans and this accounts for abstaining on as 
much as 20 to 25% of the ballot. 
14Vanderleeuw and Engstrom (1987) use data from an October 22, 1983 election in New Orleans, 
Louisiana. The ballot begins with the gubernatorial contest and concludes with three local referendum. 
They use precinct level data, where 97 of the 464 precincts are more than ninety percent African­
American, and 122 precincts are more than ninety percent white. 
15Darcy and Schneider (1988) use data from a 1986 general election in Oklahoma. Their roll-off 
numbers are based on aggregate data from 74 counties using paper ballots and three counties employing 
optical ballots. 
16Darcy and Schneider regress the roll-off percentages for various offices and state questions against 
age and race variables. They find that African-Americans roll-off consistently more than whites. 
17Bowler, Donovan, and Happ (1992) analyze aggregate election results for California propositions from 
1974 to 1988. They define drop-off as the difference between ballots cast and votes on the proposition, 
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In sum, prior studies have mostly found support for the hypothesis that voters roll-off 
the ballot. The empirical models employed in these studies have either controlled for 
socioeconomic, ballot, or proposition characteristics, but only rarely a combination of 
such factors. Other studies have considered whether voters tire as they proceed down 
the ballot and vote "No" or abstain more often. The evidence for voter fatigue is less 
apparent. 
3 A Discrete-Choice Model of Proposition Voting 
There are two decisions required of a voter in the voting booth - whether to cast a vote 
in a particular contest and the position to take on that contest. Figure 1 displays the 
nested decisions involved in simultaneously determining an issue position and the decision 
to vote or not to vote on a specific issue.18 This nesting suggests that an individual's 
position on a proposition or the proposition's salience can influence the decision to vote 
or not to vote on that proposition. 
[Place Figure 1 Here] 
The first stage in this model exhibits the voter roll-off phenomena. Here the number 
of voters deciding to vote versus the number abstaining defines the relevant measure. 
Similarly, the second stage of this model exhibits the fatigued voter syndrome. The 
voter casts a "Yes" when the issue is important, but either votes "No" or abstains on 
low-salience issues. If a voter is fatigued they will vote "Yes" less often, all other things 
equal, as they progress down the ballot. 
Since the voter faces a series of nested decisions, a nested logit approach to estimation 
is suggested. This requires estimating the expected maximum utility, or inclusive value, 
from the second stage and including this value as a determinant of voting in the first 
stage. Specific to this case, the inclusive value measures the expected maximum utility 
from choosing a position and depends on the difference in the alternatives ( "Yes" and 
"No") as perceived by the voter. Since our study relies on aggregate demographic and 
socioeconomic data, we are unable to measure any differences directly related to an 
individual's issue position. 
divided by the number of ballots cast. Bowler, Donovan, and Happ find that negative campaign spending 
and proposition positien signific-antly-infhiem:e-the <lrop-off percentage. 
18We consider two alternative models. In the first alternative model the voter first decides whether or 
not to support an issue, and if not, then whether to vote "No" on the issue or abstain. Here voting "No" 
represents either an issue position, or similar to abstaining, i.e., a vote for the status quo. The second 
alternative model is a three-choice single stage model where the voter's decision between voting "Yes", 
voting "No", and abstaining is viewed as a single choice. We used the Akaike Information Criterion to 
compare the three models. The model depicted in Figure 1 was chosen as a result of this test. 
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Although the calculation of an inclusive value is not possible in this situation, there 
are factors related to the propositions that may be useful as proxies for the expected 
maximum utility derived from voting. The first factor is a measure of a proposition's 
level of controversy. The level of controversy is typically positively correlated with the 
likelihood that polls taken immediately prior to the election include that proposition. 
The associated increase in publicity and voter awareness for controversial propositions · 
may increase the probability of voting on the proposition. In addition, if the proposition 
is considered "close", i.e., the outcome cannot reasonably be determined prior to the 
election, then the probability a voter casts a vote on that proposition may also increase. 
Hence, we rely on poll coverage information and a measure of closeness as proxies for the 
expected maximum utility derived from the second stage vote decision. These factors 
are discussed in greater detail in the next section. We estimate our model of proposition 
voting behavior using a binary logit specification for the probabilities of voting at each 
stage of the decision tree. 19 Estimation is performed within the Statistical Software Tools
econometric package (Dubin and Rivers (1988)). 
4 Data 
The two primary data sources for this analysis are the ballot image files prepared by the 
California Secretary of State and the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Summary 
Tape File 3 (STF3A) , from the Bureau of the Census. Two additional sources of data are 
the Statement of the Vote (SOY) and the Precinct Information File (PIF) , both available 
from the California Secretary of State. 20 Their primary function is to aid matching the 
electoral data on the ballot image files with the socio-demographic data available from 
the census. 
4.1 Ballot Images 
The primary dataset consists of images from the actual ballots cast in Los Angeles county 
in the 1988, 1990, and 1992 general elections. 21 Los Angeles county tabulates and records 
votes using a punch-card style ballot. The voter physically perforates her card in a 
specified box to indicate her vote. The evening of the election the cards are collected 
by precinct and transported to a central location where a machine reads the cards. As 
a by-product of tabulating the votes, a binary image of each ballot is written to a set 
190ur econometric approach treats the choices by an individual across propositions as independent 
selections. This may oe too simplistic since the majority of the voters tend to complete all or almost all 
propositions. See Dubin and Gerber (1992) for an approach to relaxing the independence assumption 
across propositions for a given individual. 
20Refer to Dubin and Kalsow (1997) for additional information on the census, SOV, and PIF data 
sources. 
21The actual ballot counts were 2,733,229, 1,925,811, and 2,831,077 for the respective elections. 
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of magnetic tapes. These tapes, after extensive manipulation, provide the data for this 
analysis. 22 
We followed the decoding process for the ballot image files suggested by Du bin and 
Gerber (1992). Part of this decoding process was to match a "correction" tape to the 
original precinct ballot images, and compare vote counts to the official Statement of Vote 
(SOV) . The completeness and accuracy of this correction tape, and hence the match rate 
to the SOV, varies somewhat by election but was nevertheless excellent for econometric 
analysis. 23 
4.2 Merging Electoral and Demographic Data 
The ballot image file contains an identifier for the voter's precinct within Los Angeles 
county. The process of matching this precinct with the census data requires two additional 
data sources, the SOV and PIF tapes. The SOV contains the current precinct numbers 
and census tract codes in effect at the time of the election. Therefore the 1988 and 1990 
SOVs contain 1980 census tract codes and the 1992 SOV contains a 1990 census tract 
code. 
The PIF contains every district and division related to an established precinct, ranging 
from U.S. congressional districts to school districts. The PIF associates 1990 census 
tracts with each precinct. It also provides the linkage between precinct codes in different 
elections. 24 
22There are several factors which complicate decoding ballots from the ballot image tape. The first is 
that the tape is not used for official purposes so its creation is often an ad hoc procedure. For example, if 
some ballots within a group are misfed into the reader, the entire group may be re-read. Our procedures 
were designed to identify and eliminate such duplications. Another complication comes from the use of 
ballot groups. Every unique combination of contests and rotation sequences constitutes a ballot group. 
(There were 388, 369, and 235 ballot groups in the 1988, 1990, and 1992 general elections, respectively.) 
Each ballot group locates a particular contest in a different punch position, depending on both the 
number of previous contests and on the number of candidates in the previous contests. An additional 
complication is that up to four card readers can be processing ballots simultaneously but ballot images 
from different precincts maybe written to the same tape. Therefore the ballot images on the tape must 
be "unshuffied" into distinct precincts prior to processing. See Dubin and Gerber (1992) for additional 
information on decoding ballot images. 
23Dubin and Gerber (1992) performed the match for the 1990 election. They matched 96.0% of the 
precincts exactly when comparing the total votes cast on the SOV to those counted from the ballot image 
tapes. In 1988, only 58.5% of the precincts were matched exactly but 89.0% were matched within four 
votes. The match rate in 1988 is lower due to the fact that the county failed to replace the tape after 
it filled up during the correction process. Therefore, some of the ballot corrections for that election are 
lost forever. In 1992 the county was extremely careful in tracking errors and processing the corrections. 
In that election 99.5% of the precincts matched exactly. 
24The process of merging electoral and demographic data does result in some mismatches. The Secre­
tary of State's office manually codes census tract and sub-tract codes for each precinct. One tract coded 
by the Secretary of State is incorrect in the 1988 and 1990 data. Ballots from that tract were dropped 
from our analysis. Refer to Dubin and Kalsow (1997) for additional information. 
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4.3 Identification of Proposition Form from Proposition Posi­
tion 
In California, propositions are listed by "form" and then in the order in which they 
qualify. Under normal conditions bonds appear first, then legislative proposals, and 
last, initiatives. In this case indicator variables identifying the proposition form are 
indistinguishable from indicator variables which identify the beginning, middle, and last 
sections of the ballot. Therefore, analysis of a single election cannot separate the effects 
of ballot position and proposition form. To· circumvent this probiem we have made 
use of a natural experiment which occurred in the 1990 election. As mentioned above, 
under nor�al circumstances bonds are given a position prior to legislative proposals and 
initiatives. In 1990 the California legislature failed to pass the bond bill in a timely enough 
fashion and the bond issues ultimately appeared following the legislative proposals and 
initiatives By pooling data across elections we are able to distinguish proposition form 
from proposition position. 
4.4 Sampling from the Data 
Since each election has from two to three million ballots, we selected a sample from 
each election for statistical analysis. A 0.1 percent random sample of the valid ballots 
was drawn from every precinct within an election, and combined into an election-wide 
sample of ballots. A total of 137,513 observations were included in our sample, the result 
of pooling 1,820 ballots from the 1988 general election, 1,826 from the 1990 general 
election, and 2,585 from the 1992 general election. 25 The sample and actual Los Angeles 
county voting percentages were 88.4% and 88.1 %, respectively. The frequency of voting 
"Yes" on a proposition in the sample was 46.2% and was 45.8% in the entirety of Los 
Angeles county. 26 
4.5 Explanatory Factors 
The explanatory factors used in our empirical models are of two types: election or 
proposition-specific characteristics and voter-specific socio-demographic characteristics. 
First we discuss election and proposition specific attributes. These are summarized in 
Table 1. 
25This process results in a sample of 1824 ballots from the 1988 general election, 1827 from the 1990 
general election, and 2970 from the 1992 general election. Of the ballots selected, a few were eliminated 
because of invalid census tract data. The total number of observations is 1, 820 * 29 + 1, 826 * 28 + 2, 585 * 
13 = 137, 513. 
26 A chi-squared statistic was computed to test for differences between the frequencies of voting and 
voting "yes" in the sample and Los Angeles county as a whole. For voting, the value of the chi-squared 
statistic is 65. 7 with 70 degrees of freedom. For voting "Yes" , the value was 69.5, also with 70 degrees of 
freedom. Therefore no significant difference between· actual and sampled frequencies were found at the 
953 level. 
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[Place Table 1 Here] 
Election-specific indicator variables capture the election's relative attractiveness com­
pared to an arbitrarily selected base period. Although it is-desirable to measure how bal­
lot length, and election timing affect participation, the impact of such variables. cannot 
be distinguished from election-specific indicators. Therefore, including election.:.specific 
indicators, in our analysis, precludes using other election-specific variables such as bal�ot 
length or a presidential versus mid-term dummy variable. 
Proposition-specific attributes are the relative position of the proposition, dollar value 
for bonds, reading ease score and word count, and variables identifying the author, poll 
coverage, and race "closeness". To measure reading ease, we use the Flesch score, as 
described in Magleby (1984). The reading ease score is a proxy for the voter's ability 
to comprehend the proposition while the number of English words is a proxy for the 
patience and time required by the voter to muddle through the legalese. The proposition 
form is represented by indicators for bonds and initiatives with legislative proposals used 
as the comparison group. Poll inclusion refers to California Field Polls conducted in 
the last weeks of October prior to the election. Closeness is an indicator for situations 
in which the "no opinion" voters could have determined the outcome when the number 
of "Yes" and "No" voters was close. Finally, we group the propositions into six major 
content areas. We define groups of propositions as those affecting state government, the 
environment, health, taxes, government benefits, humanitarian goals, or those affecting 
other issues. 
The demographic explanatory variables, we use, consist of race and ethnicity, socioe­
conomic, and social connectedness (Teixeira (1992)) factors. The socioeconomic factors 
include age, income, average education, homeownership, and residential mobility. In 
addition, we control for employment in each of four occup_ational groups. 27 The social 
connectedness explanatory factors include the presence of a spouse or children and the 
linguistic isolation of the household.28 
· 
· 
5 Hypotheses 
The overall characteristics of the ballot are important in making comparisons of par­
ticipation across elections. The 1988 and 1992 elections, for example, are presidential 
elections and as such experience higher turnout than the 1990 election. Such effects can 
be controlled for in the analysis using treatment indicators for two of the elections. Other 
proposition attributes which potentially influence participation include the proposition 
27See Dubin and Kalsow (1997) for details on the construction of these variables. 
28The linguistic isolation variable is the percentage of households where no one over the age of 14 
speaks only English and no one over 14 who speaks a language other than English speaks English "very 
well" (U.S. Department of Commerce (1991)). 
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form and content, the readability and length of the proposition, the ballot position, and 
the dollar value of the issue. 
Proposition form, classified as either the California Legislature or the "people", can 
influence a voter's decision. Initiatives placed on the ballot via petitions signed by a 
significant number of registered voters already have pre-election visibility. 29 Additionally, 
the legislature places two types of propositions on the ballot. The first are issues the 
legislature determines should be decided by the voters themselves, either because they 
are controversial, or because a legislator may not wish to express an opinion on t'he · 
matter. The other type of issue legislatures add to the ballot are those that they are 
bound to put before the electorate. This includes constitutional amendments and bond 
issues. 
In this analysis, we partition propositions into three groups: constitutional amend­
ments and statutes placed on the ballot by the legislature, constitutional amendments 
and statues placed on the ballot by the people, and bonds placed on the ballot by the 
legislature. The form of the proposition is printed as part of the official description so it 
is available to the voter at the time they cast their vote. If voters view bonds as "costing" 
taxpayers money, they may vote on bonds more often than legislative proposals. In addi­
tion, if initiatives are viewed as "citizen" issues, then they should be voted on more often 
than legislative proposals. Since many legislative proposals appear on the ballot because 
they are controversial, voters may vote "Yes" less frequently as a way of maintaining the 
status quo. 
The readability of the official text of a proposition should be correlated with the 
ability of the voter to understand the proposition. It measures the difficulty of the task 
while the length of the proposition measures the magnitude of the task. Prior studies find 
that less than one third of California voters actually read ballot pamphlets sent to the 
home. 30 An unknown percentage of those people read and comprehend the official jargon. 
In addition, many voters determine their position on propositions in the voting booth. 31 
Presumably most voters do not carry their sample ballot into the booth so ·the only 
information available is the official description printed on the ballot. Our expectation is · 
that the more difficult it is to comprehend a proposition the less often voters will vote 
"Yes". An increase in the measured reading ease score should increase the number of 
voters participating by increasing the chance they understand the proposition.32 This 
increase in comprehension may further increase the number "Yes" votes if "No" votes 
are the result of favoring the status quo over the unknown. 
The length of each proposition, measured by the number of words in the English 
version of the text, measures the magnitude of the effort required to simply read the 
29See F itzgerald (1980) for information on qualifying a proposition for the ballot in California. 
30See Magleby (1984), page 136. 
31See Magleby (1984), page 124. 
32The Flesch formula rates samples on a scale from 0 to 100 with 0 being the most difficult. The 
reading ease is estimated as: 206.835 - -0.846· number of syllables per 100 words - - 1.015· average 
number of words per sentence. 
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proposition. On the one hand, it is reasonable to anticipate a negative relationship 
between text length and voting due to sheer effort. On the other hand, the length of 
the text may be a cue to the proposition's importance. In this case, length would be 
positively correlated with participation. A longer length could also indicate a careful 
explanation of the proposition which may cause less confusion. A lower level of confusion 
may result in more affirmative votes provided that some portion of the negative votes· 
result from the desire to preserve the status quo. · 
If a proposition has sufficient visibility, due to either the campaign or the salience· of 
the issue, then it is usually included in the California Field Poll immediately prior to the 
election. Therefore, poll coverage should be positively correlated with the probability of 
voting. Similarly, if an increase in the level of controversy implies a higher level of oppo­
sition then poll coverage should not be positively related to voting "Yes". In addition, 
if the results of the poll indicate that a race is indeterminate then the communication of 
those results may increase voter participation on that particular proposition and decrease 
voter fatigue. 33 
A proposition's content should be a very important determinant of voter participation 
and voter position. The 1988, 1990, and 1992 general election propositions cover a 
diverse set of topics, ranging from education and taxes, to environmental concerns such 
as forestry, the use of pesticides, and communicable disease testing. Verba and Nie (1972) 
find that people in lower socioeconomic strata vote less often on global issues, and more 
often on issues affecting their everyday lives. If Verba and Nie's results hold then issues 
such as alcohol taxes and education should have higher levels of participation than do 
issues of state government. If spending tax dollars is a concern then items with high 
perceived costs such as government benefits and education may receive more negative 
votes. 
The final ballot cha:racteristic, we consider, is the position of the proposition. As 
ballots differ in length, we convert the ballot position into a relative position. If roll-off 
exists, and if abstention on a proposition is not attributable to any of the other factors 
considered, then the coefficient for the proposition number (i. e. , its relative position 
on the ballot) should be negative. Similarly, as voter fatigue is represented by fewer 
affirmative votes, ceteris paribus, we should see a decrease in affirmative voting occur 
with an increase in proposition position provided that voter fatigue is present. 
6 Results 
Several results emerge by simple inspection of the proposition-specific participation re­
sults. The first result comes from Tables 2, 3, and 4, which provide state-wide participa­
tion rates by proposition. Contrary to prior findings, the Los Angeles county ballot data 
33Visibility and poll coverage are likely to be correlated with the levels of campaign expenditures, 
media exposure, and popular support. · 
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do not support the hypothesis that there are a large number of fatigued voters skipping 
propositions in the middle. If that were the case, we should find a higher percentage of 
voters voting on the first and last proposition groups than for those in the middle group. 
If significant numbers of voters skipped more than one or two propositions in the middle 
we should see large numbers of votes among fewer propositions. Similarly, if voters were 
skipping the middle third of the ballot then the frequency of voting on two-thirds of the· 
ballot should be relatively high. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. This can 
be verified by inspection of the distribution of the number of votes cast by voters, which 
we present in Table 5. 
Inspection of Table 5 dispels two other hypothesis. The first is that there are a large 
number of voters who vote on almost every contest and a smaller number of voters who 
abstain on almost every contest. This situation would lead to significant variation in the 
number of propositions on which voters cast votes. For example, the situation could be 
that 85% of the voters vote on all propositions and 15% vote on almost no propositions. 
The other possibility is that there are large numbers of voters abstaining on a few contests 
each but in sufficiently different patterns that the aggregate percentages remain relatively 
constant. This could occur, for example, if most voters cast ballots in 85% of the contests. 
Table 5 demonstrates that neither hypotheses is supported. The vast majority of voters 
cast a valid vote on all, or almost all, propositions on the ballot in the elections studied. 34 
[Place Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 Here] 
6.1 Effects of Proposition Characteristics 
In Table 6 we present om.- logit model for proposition voting. The estimation allows the 
effects of race, socioeconomic, and social connectedness factors to be separated from the 
effects of election or proposition-specific attributes. 35 Our results on proposition ballot 
position and readability are generally consistent with those of Magleby (1984). We find 
that the probability that a voter casts a valid vote on a proposition is negatively related 
to the proposition's ballot position. Our findings on ballot position therefore contradict 
Zisk's (1987) finding of no relationship between voting and ballot position. 
Increasing the reading ease score, i.e. , making the proposition easier to read, increases 
the probability that an individual votes on a proposition. This result is consistent with 
34It is important to note that this result can only be obtained with individual level ballot data. The 
aggregate statistics do not reveal which voters skip which propositions. For example, it is impossible to 
distinguish between two extreme situations wherein t.he aggregate vote count reflects 883 participation. 
The first is where 883 of the voters vote on all propositions and 123 abstain on all propositions. The 
second situation, indistinguishable with aggregate statistics from the first, is where 1003 of the voters 
vote on 883 of the propositions. 
35The detailed results for the socio-demographic control factors have been omitted for brevity but are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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that found by Magleby (1984). If the reading ease score reflects the intensity of effort 
required to comprehend a proposition then the length reflects the duration of that effort. 
The effects of proposition length differ, however, by proposition type. The longer is a 
leg_islative proposal the more people vote on it. The same is true, but to a lesser degree, 
for initiatives. On the other hand, proposition length does not appear to influence voter 
participation on bond issues. 
[Place Table 6 Here] 
Similar to the results of Magleby (1984) and Zisk (1987), we find increased participa­
tion rates for citizen initiatives over legislative proposals. Unlike Bowler, Donovan, and 
Happ (1992), we find that bonds and initiatives attract more voters than do legislative 
proposals. We also find that bond dollars are negatively correlated with voter partici­
pation, ceteris paribus. As anticipated, an increase in the level of controversy, reflected 
by poll coverage, is positively related to voting. The impact on voter participation of a 
prior poll showing a close race is negative for legislative proposals and bond issues but 
essentially zero for initiatives. 
Influencing proposition content is not easily accomplished beyond recasting the propo­
sition in a different light. However, content does appear to impact the participation level. 
People tend to cast votes on environmental, health, tax, government benefit, and human­
itarian issues. In contrast, the same voters ignore issues on running state government. 
This is consistent with Matsusaka's (1992) results where he finds a lower voting percent­
age on efficiency issues compared with distributional issues. 
Our analysis of affirmative voting is presented in Table 7. We find that affirmative 
voting and proposition position are positively related for legislative proposals, but nega­
tively refated for bonds and initiatives. Thus, the further down a voter is on the ballot 
the more likely they are to cast either a "No" vote or abstain, ceteris paribus. This 
contradicts Zisk's finding of no relationship between negative voting and ballot position. 
We find that the easier the proposition text is to read, the more likely the voter is to vote 
"Yes" on bonds and initiatives. However, the easier the legislative proposal is to read, 
the less likely voters are to vote "Yes". This supports the hypothesis that voters prefer 
the status quo when they are either unable to understand the consequences of a "Yes" 
vote or when they are confused. 
[Place Table 7 Here] 
The empirical evidence suggests that other unspecified proposition and election­
specific characteristics may be affecting the, probability that a voter casts a positive 
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vote on a proposition.36 In 1988 and 1990 voters cast more "Yes" votes on propositions 
relative to 1992, ceteris paribus. However, voters supported initiatives in 1988 and 1990 
less than in 1992. This same pattern was found for bond issues in 1990. 
As anticipated, an increase in bond dollars decreases the probability of voting "Yes". 
An increase in the level of controversy decreases the frequency of "Yes" votes. Hence if 
voters believe that the contest is close then they generally vote "Yes" less often. Finally, 
proposition content affects the "Yes" votes, as expected, with those "costing" money 
such as sta�e government, the environment, .taxes, and health issues, receiving fe�er 
"Yes" votes, and those issues "benefiting" an individual, such as the level of. government 
benefits and educational expenses, receiving more "Yes" votes. 
7 Discussion and Conclusion 
Our results show very clear patterns for roll-off and voter fatigue: voters roll-off and 
tire with longer ballots. Since voters are either rolling off or experiencing fatigue with 
longer ballots, a modification in the proposition number assignment process may be in 
order. Proposition numbers are currently assigned based on the order that the petitions 
are filed within each type (bonds, legislative proposals, and initiatives). A petitioner 
could potentially affect the outcome of a specific race by simply filing earlier in the 
process and thus receiving a better ballot position. One possible remedy would be to 
rotate propositions on ballots in a manner similar to that already employed in candidate 
elections. 
In addition to the proposition position effects, there are very clear effects resulting 
from the proposition text itself. The easier the text is to read the more likely people 
are to cast votes. Also, the easier the text is to read the more likely people are to vote 
affirmatively. This should provide an incentive for authors of propositions to write th.eir 
text as clearly as possible. 37 
The payoff to an interest group for filing a petition early or ensuring that wording is 
understandable is high. Twenty percent of the propositions in the elections studied were 
won or lost by less than five percent of the ballots cast. Of those, three were initiatives 
36Some of the data required to measure these characteristics is simply unavailable, while other data is 
available but not at a sufficiently low level of detail to be useful in the empirical analysis. The unavailable 
data includes the level of campaign spending and related measures of media exposure. While the number 
of rallies and demonstrations may be measurable, it would be impossible to determine which voters were 
exposed to such event-s. Therefore this-data could ne:ver be- accurately .matched to voters or precincts. 
The distribution of campaign literature is another measure which may be measurable but is not available 
at a level of detail that could be matched to voting precincts. 
37 A clever author could write text that receives a higher reading ease score but is still incomprehensible. 
For example, the use of double negatives may disguise the difficulty of understanding the issue while 
not affecting the reading ease score. A complicated proposition description could involve only short 
words, but contain more negatives than the average person is able to comprehend, thereby obscuring 
the meaning or impact of the proposition to many voters. Such instances are hopefully special cases. 
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whose outcomes were decided with a difference of less than two percent of the ballots cast. 
If established interest groups or other citizen groups were to optimize their proposition's 
ballot characteristics, they could potentially affect the outcome. An interest group's 
proposition may qualify for the ballot at an earlier date than other propositions. This 
fact alone places it earlier on the ballot in California. Interest groups may also be sly in 
their wording of propositions (e.g. , Proposition 188 in the 1994 general election) and may 
have an increased awareness of the impact of text length and readability on individual 
voting behavior. 
The advantage gained by awareness of these factors can be significant. For example, 
if the reading ease is increased by 1 %, from 29.0 to 29.3, then the estimated voter 
participation increase is extremely small, from ·90.0% to only 90.003%. Similarly, a 1 % 
increase in the number of English words for an initiative, from 64.0  to 64.6, will decrease 
the estimated voter participation from 90.0% to only 89.99%. But more significantly, if 
an initiative moves up one percent in relative position on the ballot, voter participation 
increases from 90.0% to 90.287%. However, in a real situation, the impact would be far 
greater. If there are twenty-five propositions on the ballot then increasing one position, 
i. e. , qualifying one earlier in the sequence, is equivalent to four percent change in position 
and therefore could be sufficient to make or break a close race. 
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Tables 
Table 1: BALLOT /PROPOSITION ATTRIBUTES 
VARIABLE 
Proposition Form 
Bond 
Initiative 
Ballot Attractiveness 
Dummy 88 
Dummy 90 
DEFINITION 
Indicator for Proposition Form. 
Indicator for Proposition Form. 
Indicator for the 1988 General Election. 
Indicator for the 1990 General Election. 
Proposition Characteristics 
Bond Dollars Dollars, in millions, as stated in the ballot. 
Reading Ease Flesch index score for the proposition's official ballot description. 
English Words Word count of the English version of the proposition's official ballot 
description. 
Poll Coverage Set to one if the proposition appeared in California Field Polls prior 
to the election. 
Closeness Set to one if the last poll prior to the election predicted a race that 
could be swung by those holding "no opinion". 
Proposition Position Percentage of propositions appearing prior to and including this 
proposition. 
Proposition Content 
State Government 
Environment 
Health 
Tax 
Government Benefits 
Humanitarian 
Propositions which affected state government, such as new offices. 
Propositions which include environmental issues, such as pesticide 
usage and foresty policy. 
Propositions based on issues which affect an individual's health or 
health insurance, or are based on the status of one's health, such as 
AIDS testing and Physician-Assisted Death. 
Taxes and other financial obligations which directly affect consumers, 
such as Tobacco and Alcohol taxes, food taxes, and insurance premiums. 
Propositions which may alter one's benefits, either directly or indirectly, 
including term limits and welfare . 
..P-ropositions. related to funding education, libraries, housing for the 
homeless, and California parks. 
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Table 2: 1988 GENERAL ELECTION PROPOSITIONS 
PROP PERCENT PERCENT 
NUMBER AUTHOR TOPIC VOTING YES 
78 Bond Education 91.1 57.7 
79 Bond Education 90.5 61.2 
80 Bond Prison 89.8 61.1
81 Bond Water 90.6 71.7
82 Bond Water 88.1 62.4
83 Bond Water 89.1 64.4 
84 Bond Homeless 91. 5 58.2
85 Bond Library 89.6 52.7 
86 Bond Prison 88.0 54.8
87 Legislature Taxes 84. 4 67. 9
88 Legislature Public Money 85. 4 74.8
89 Lesislature Parole 87.9 55.0 
90 Legislature Property Tax 86.3 69.1
91 Legislature Courts 82.8 70.7 
92 Legislature Judicial Performance 82.7 74.2
93 Legislature Veterans 86.9 70.8
94 Legislature Judicial Employment 86.2 65. 1
95 Initi�tive Homeless 88.8 45.2 
96 Initiative Disease 90.5 62.4
97 Initiative Work Safety 87.2 53.7 
98 Initiative Education 89.6 50.7
99 Initiative Alcohol and Tobacco Tax 94.6 58.2 
100 Initiative Insurance 92.3 40.9
101 Initiative Insurance 90. 7 13.3 
102 Initiative Disease 91.5 34.4 
103 Initiative Insurance 92.9 51.1
104 Initiative Insurance 92.3 25. 4
105 Initiative Consumers 87.2 54.5 
106 Initiative Attorney Fees 89.7 46.9
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Table 3: 1990 GENERAL ELECTION PROPOSITIONS 
PROP PERCENT PERCENT 
NUMBER AUTHOR TOPIC VOTING YES 
124 Legislature Hospitals 89.1 45.8 
125 Legislature Rail Transit 89.7 45.6 
126 Legislature Alcohol Tax 92.8 40.9 
127 Legislature Property Tax 90.9 61.7 
128 Initiative Environment 93.6 35.6 
129 Initiative Drugs 90.7 27.6 
130 Initiative Forestry 93.3 47.9 
131 Initiative Term Limits 91.3 37.8
132 Initiative Marine Resources 89.9 55.8
133 Initiative Drugs 90.6 31.9 
134 Initiative Alcohol Tax 93.3 31.0
135 Initiative Pesticide 91.2 30.4 
136 Initiative Taxes 91.0 47.9 
137 Initiative Initiative and 88.8 45.0 
Referendum Process 
138 Initiative Forestry 92. 6 28.8 
139 Initiative Prison Labor 90.6 54.0 
140 Initiative Term Limits 90.9 52.2 
141 Initiative Toxic Chemicals 87.0  48.5 
142 Bond Veterans 89.1 59.0 
143 Bond Education 89.5 48.8 
144 Bond Prison 90.0 40.4 
145 Bond Housing 89.1 44.5 
146 Bond Education 89.9 51.8 
147 Bond Prison 87.4 37.3 
148 Bond Water 87.5 43.8 
149 Bond Parks and Recreation 89.6 47.1 
150 Bond Courts 87.8 26.4
151 Bond Child Care 89.6 47.5 
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Table 4: 1992 GENERAL ELECTION PROPOSITIONS 
.PROP PERCENT PERCENT 
NUMBER AUTHOR TOPIC VOTING YES 
155 Bond Education 92.3 51.8
156 Bond Rail Transit 89.7 48.1
157 Legislature Toll Roads & Highways 89.0 28.2
158 Legislature Office:California Analyst 86.0 39.9 
159 Legislature Office:Auditor General 85.1 41.0
160 Legislature Property Tax 90.1 51.6 
161 Initiative Physician-Assisted Death 93.2 45.9 
162 Initiative Public Employees' Retirement 87.3 51.0 
163 Initiative Tax on Certain Food Products 92.0 66.6 
164 Initiative Term Limits 91.0 63.6 
165 Initiative Budget Process 91.8 46.6 
166 Initiative Basic Health Care 92.9 30.8
167 Initiative State Income Taxes 92.7 44.6 
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Table 5: DISTRIBUTION OF PROPOSITION VOTES IN L. A. COUNTY 
TOTAL CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF 
NUMBER OF VOTERS CASTING "N" VOTES 
VOTES CAST 1988 1990 1992 
0 1.10 1.75 1.90 
1 1.70 2.35 2.64 
2 2.30 3.01 3.96 
3 3.12 3.83 4.85 
4 3.89 4.54 5.97 
5 4.60 5.09 6.94 
6 5.26 5.69 8.26 
7 6.25 6.29. 9.85 
8 7.40 6.73 11.24 
9 8.33 7.11 13.06 
10 8.60 7.88 15.54 
11 9.15 8.65 19.06 
12 9.75 9.14 31.05 
13 10.19 9.91 100.00 
14 10.79 10.68 
15 11.23 11.06 
16 12.05 11.88 
17 12.65 12.10 
18 13.31 12.81 
19 14.02 13.85 
20 14.95 15.05 
21 16.16 15.71 
22 17.26 16.64 
23 17.86 18.12 
24 19.23 19.71 
25 20.77 21.79 
26 23.84 25.18 
27 28.77 35.80 
28 41.27 100.00 
29 100.00 
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Table 6: VOTING ON PROPOSITIONS IN L. A. COUNTYt 
VARJABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
Constant 0.190 0.38 
Proposition Form 
Bond 0.269 ** 2.41 
Initiative 0.178 * 1.74 
Ballot Attractiveness 
Dummy, 1988 Election -0.218 *** -6.44 
Dummy, 1990 Election -0.181 *** -5.90 
Proposition Characteristics 
Bond Dollars (millions) -0.0002 *** -3.49 
Reading Ease Score 0.001 ** 2.16 
English Words 0.004 *** 4.17 
English Words * Bond -0.004 *** -3.94 
English Words * Initiative -0.003 *** -3.46 
Poll Coverage 0.096 ** 2.28 
Poll Closeness -0.387 *** -3.47 
Poll Closeness * Bond 0.223 * 1.79 
Poll Closeness * Initiative 0.384 *** 3.43 
Proposition Position -0.261 *** -5.14 
Proposition Content 
State Government -0.215 *** -4.30 
Environment 0.287 *** 5.28 
Health 0.379 *** 7.54 
Tax 0.454 *** 10.83 
Government Benefits 0.225 *** 4.35 
Humanitarian 0.151 *** 4.71 
Number of Observations 137513 
Percent Correctly Predicted 88.475 
t The dependent variable is whether or not an individual votes on a 
specific ballot proposition. 
Note:*p=.10, **p=.05, ***p=.01 
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Table 7: VOTING YES ON PROPOSITIONS IN L. A. COUNTYt 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
Constant -0.663 * -1.79 
Proposition Form 
Bond 1.473 *** 7.15 
Dummy; 1988 * Bond 0.060 0.78 
Dummy, 1990 * Bond -1.209 *** -8.51 
Initiative 2.720 *** 14.79 
Dummy, 1988 * Initiative -0.786 *** -13.75 
Dummy, 1990 * Initiative -1.845 *** -25.42 
Ballot Attractiveness 
Dummy, 1988 Election 0.723 *** 14.46 
Dummy, 1990 Election 1.306 *** 20.37 
Proposition Characteristics 
Bond Dollars (millions) -0.0001 ** -2.38 
Reading Ease Score -0.013 *** -12.35 
Reading Ease * Bond 0.023 *** 16.74 
Reading Ease * Initiative 0.018 *** 14.17 
English Words 0.003 *** 3.26 
English Words * Bond 0.001 0.93 
English Words * Initiative -0.005 *** -5.51 
Poll Coverages -0.314 *** -9.38 
Poll Closeness -0.221 *** -2.89 
Poll Closeness * Bond -0.030 -0.34 
Poll Closeness * Initiative 0.255 *** 3.38 
Proposition Position 3.526 *** 19.66 
Prop. Position * Bond -4.003 *** -15.69 
Prop. Position * Initiative . -4.550 *** -23.53 
Proposition Content 
State Government -0.024 -0.50 
Environment -0.210 *** -6.07 
Health -0.475 *** -14.08 
Tax -0.107 *** -3.65 
Government Benefits 0.008 0.24 
Humanitarian 0.0007 0.03 
Number -of Observations 121664 
Percent Correctly Predicted 59.771 
t The dependent variable is whether an individual votes YES 
versus voting NO or abstaining on a specific proposition. 
Note:*p=.10, **p=.05, ***p=.01 
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Figure 
Figure 1: VOTING MODEL 
Vote Yes 
Vote • • • •
Vote No 
bstain 
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